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THE RHETORICS OF TAKINGS CASES:
IT'S MINE V. LET'S SHARE
Susan Ayres*
"Possession as the basis of property ownership . . . seems to amount to something
like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. The first to say, 'This is
mine,' in a way that the public understands, gets the prize...
-
Carol Rose
1
"Observe due measure, and proportion is best in all things."
-
Hesiod
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulatory takings cases originated in 1922 when Justice Holmes, in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, ruled that "while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing."3 This simple rule has resulted in over eighty years of case law that Carol
Rose states has left takings law to "muddle along."4 While many legal scholars
decry the incoherence and inconsistency of takings case law,' this article
provides a rhetorical analysis that explains the "muddle" as a result of rhetori-
* Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. B.A. Baylor University,
1982; M.A., University of Texas at San Antonio, 1985; J.D., Baylor University School of
Law, 1988; Ph.D. Texas Christian University, 1997. Thanks to my colleagues Stephen
Alton, Cynthia Fountaine, Earl Martin, Jr., and Aric Short, and to participants in the 11 th
Biennial Conference of the Rhetoric Society of America, Austin, Texas, May 2004 for
thoughtful comments. I am also grateful to Professors Laura Underkuffler and Nancy Myers
for invaluable criticism. My appreciation goes to Adam Plumbley and Dianna Zuniga for
excellent research assistance, to Christina Rodriguez for technical assistance, to Ira David for
careful reading and editing, and to Texas Wesleyan University School of Law for financial
support of this project.
1 CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHErORIuC OF OWNERSHIP 16 (1994).
2 Phillip Sipiora, Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos, in RHETORIC AND KAIROS:
ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 1, 2 (Phillip Sipiora & James S. Baumlin eds.,
2002).
3 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
' RosE, supra note 1, at 65-66; see also, Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation:
Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 1, 20 (2000) (describing
takings cases as "chaotic").
I See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28
IND. L. REv. 329 (1995); John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (2003); Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE
AND ENvTL. L. 1, 1-2 (2003).
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cal tensions between a Sophistic approach ("Let's Share") and an Aristotelian
approach ("It's Mine).6
Part One of this article develops the concept of kairos as right timing and
due measure. It argues that takings cases inherently concern kairic questions
because regulatory takings cases involve constantly changing rules, and the
court must determine whether the rules have gone "too far" as to require being
treated as a taking.' As Holly Doremus and others have observed, regulatory
takings cases are "fundamentally conflicts over legal transitions, They arise
when the rules change, those changes are costly (in economic or other terms),
and the people bearing the costs believe that they are being unfairly singled out.
The problem is . . . simply that the rules are different than they once were. ' 8
Determining how to handle these changing rules involves considerations of
kairos.
Part Two develops the distinction between Let's Share and It's Mine rhet-
orics. Let's Share is the Sophistic rhetoric of possibility.9 Let's Share empha-
sizes kairos (or right timing), the future, and contingency. It's Mine is the
Aristotelian rhetoric of actuality1 ° that focuses on chronos (or linear time), the
past, and custom. While It's Mine focuses on custom (or precedent), Let's
Share focuses on practical wisdom to solve problems arising from contingency.
In addition to defining these competing rhetorics, Part Two discusses the paral-
lels between Let's Share/It's Mine and the dichotomies described by Carol
Rose" and Laura Underkuffler."2 Rose's distinction between property as
proper and property as utilitarian parallels the distinction between Let's Share
and It's Mine. 13 Likewise, Underkuffler's distinction between the operative
conception of property and the common conception of property also parallels
Let's Share and It's Mine rhetorics."4
Part Three of this article analyzes the competing rhetorics in the recent
United States Supreme Court decision of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.1 5 The
Court's majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions display a tension between
Let's Share and It's Mine rhetorics. I argue that these competing rhetorics pro-
vide an explanation for the "muddle" of takings jurisprudence. This analysis,
based on concepts from ancient Greek rhetoric, provides a new way to view
6 In teaching property, I have used the labels "It's Mine" and "Let's Share." However, as
the epigraph from Carol Rose indicates, other scholars have similarly noted the possessive
nature of property rights. See ROSE, supra note 1. Kevin Gray has also observed that "we
are still not far removed from the primitive, instinctive cries of identification which resound
in the playgroup or playground: 'That's not yours' it's mine."' Kevin Gray, Equitable
Property, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 157, 158 nn.2-3 (1994), quoted in LAURA S.
UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 1 n.2 (2003).
7 Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
8 Doremus, supra note 5, at 3; see also Rose, supra note 4, at 18.
9 See John Poulakos, Rhetoric, the Sophists, and the Possible, 51 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 215
(1984). See infra text accompanying note 92.
lO Id. See infra text accompanying note 92.
11 RosE, supra note 1, at 49-70.
12 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 6, at 49-51.
13 ROSE, supra note 1, at 64. See infra text accompanying note 108.
14 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 6, at 49-51. See infra text accompanying note 118.
15 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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legal discourse and has the possibility of shaping how we think about takings
jurisprudence.
II. KAIROS
The concept of kairos had many meanings in ancient Greece, but in
essence combines the notions of right-timing and due measure as discussed
more fully below.' 6 Modem scholars have neglected the concept of kairos
until fairly recently. 7 While Italian rhetoricians examined kairos in the 1920s,
their scholarship was not translated into English until 2002.18 In the 1980s and
continuing to the present, American rhetoricians began paying more attention
to the work of the pre-Socratics and to the concept of kairos. 9 The resurgence
of rhetoricians' scholarly interest in kairos provides a new and useful approach
to examine takings discourse. Even though many contemporary legal scholars
have written about the rhetoric of legal discourse, none have focused on kairos
as an approach for interpretation.20
16 Sipiora, supra note 2, at 1.
17 James L. Kinneavy, Kairos in Classical and Modem Rhetorical Theory, in RHETORIC
AND KAIROS, supra note 2, at 58. Paul Tillich, the theologian, also applied the concept of
kairos in his writings. See, e.g., Paul Tillich, 3 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: LIFE AND THE
SPIRIT: HISTORY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD 6, 140, 153, 220, 369-74 (1963). Kinneavy
summarizes Tillich's distinction between kairos and logos as follows: "Tillich distin-
guishes logos-thinking as characterized by an emphasis on timelessness, on form, on law, on
stasis, on method.... Opposing this trend is kairos-thinking, characterized by an emphasis
on time, on change, on creation, on conflict, on fate, and on individuality." Kinneavy,
supra, at 63.
18 Kinneavy, supra note 17, at 59-60; see also Augusto Rostagni, A New Chapter in the
History of Rhetoric and Sophistry, in RHErORIC AND KAIROS, supra note 2.
19 See, e.g., essays collected in RHETORIC AND KAIROS, supra note 2.
20 For a general application of rhetoric to legal discourse, see, e.g., JAMES BOYD WrITE,
HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES Bov
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990)
(especially chapters 4 and 10); JEROME BRUNER AND ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE
LAW 165-66 (2000); LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHEToRIc IN TE LAW (Peter Brooks
& Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). Some recent law articles mention kairos, but do so in a fleeting
manner. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Shakespeare and the Law Collection: Law and Litera-
ture and Shakespeare: Explorations, 26 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2001) (discussing
kairos or "the time or the age" or "ripeness" in Plutarch and Shakespeare's versions of Julius
Caesar); George Kamberelis, Genre as Institutionally Informed Social Practice, 6 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 143-44 (1995) (discussing kairos or "rhetorical timing and oppor-
tunity" in the differing receptions of discoveries of DNA); Robert W. Tuttle, All You Need is
Love: Paul Ramsey's Basic Christian Ethics and the Dilemma of Protestant Antilegalism,
18 J.L. & RELIGION 427, 440 (2002-2003) (discussing Protestant antilegalism in the gam-
bling context and arguing that Tillich's emphasis on kairos as involving "the special
demands of the historical moment" means that law's rigidity explains why law is "inade-
qua[te] as the form of Christian love.").
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A. What is Kairos?
Although Kairos was a Greek God, a young ephebe who represented
opportunity,21 the concept of kairos permeated Greek culture and literature and
was considered the cornerstone of ancient rhetoric in Greece's Golden Age.22
Kairos had many meanings in ancient Greece, such as "'symmetry,' 'propri-
ety,' 'occasion,' 'due measure,' 'fitness,' 'tact,' 'decorum,' 'convenience,'
'proportion,' 'fruit,' 'profit,' and 'wise moderation."'23 However, its primary
meaning combines right timing (or a time to) and due measure, as encapsulated
in Hesiod's 7th B.C.E. maxim, "Observe due measure, and proportion is best in
all things."24
The first facet of kairos - right timing - can be contrasted with chronos
or linear time. 25 Kairos is qualitative, while chronos is quantitative. 26 An
example of this distinction is the contrast between the process of making wine
(chronos), and the right time to harvest grapes or to allow wine to mature
(kairos).27 In a lawsuit, chronos is the sequence of events, the procedural and
factual history, while kairos is the right time or opportunity to settle a lawsuit,
to ask a witness a crucial question, or to make a persuasive argument before a
jury.28 Some lawsuits and legal claims are much more kairic than others, and
as argued in the next section, takings claims are inherently kairic.
The second facet of kairos - due measure - involves the concept of pro-
priety, which was especially important to the Stoics and to Cicero, who merged
the idea of kairos with prepon (propriety or fitness).2 9 Kairos as propriety was
also important to both Plato and Aristotle, who grounded their concept of virtue
as the mean between two extremes.3°
While the concept of kairos was important in ancient Greece, it was espe-
cially important to the Sophists, such as Isocrates (436-338 B.C.E.) 3 ' and Gor-
gias (480-376 B.C.E.).3 2 Isocrates made kairos the basic concept for his
educational system or paideia, which strove to turn out socially responsible
citizens. 33 The Sophists taught that the contingency of the rhetorical situation
was not something one could plan for, so the wise individual needed to be
flexible, to rely on practical wisdom (phronesis), "with, always, an intense
21 James L. Kinneavy, Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric, in RHETORIC
AND PRAxis: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC TO PRACTICAL REASONING 79, 93
(Jean Dietz Moss ed., 1986); Sipiora, supra note 2, at 1.
22 Sipiora, supra note 2, at 3.
23 Id. at 1.
24 Id. at 2; Kinneavy, supra note 21, at 85-86.
25 Sipiora, supra note 2, at 2.
26 See John E. Smith, Time and Qualitative Time, in RHETORIC AND KAiROS, supra note 2,
at 46.
27 Id. at 48.
28 See, e.g., Richard Leo Enos, Inventional Constraints on the Technographers of Ancient
Athens, in RHETORIC AND KAIROS, supra note 2, at 77, 82-84 (discussing the kairos of
timing by the use of water clock in ancient Athenian speeches).
29 Kinneavy, supra note 17, at 59.
30 Id. at 62.
31 Sipiora, supra note 2, at 7-15.
32 Rostagni, supra note 18, at 23 (tracing Gorgias's views to Pythagoras).
33 Sipiora, supra note 2, at 1, 5.
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awareness of occasion, audience, and situational context."34 Kairos can thus
be considered as a form of improvisation in which "every rhetorical act
becomes a reinvention of theory as well as of the discourse."3 5 Doro Levi, one
of the Italian scholars of kairos, expressed this sense of improvisation when he
contrasted the Socratic and pre-Socratic sensibilities as follows: "To the
Socratic 'Know thyself,' the pre-Socratic ethic juxtaposed its own 'Know the
opportunity.' ,36 Kairos is relevant to legal discourse in which lawyers and
judges constantly resolve disputes with an awareness of occasion, audience,
contingency, and the specifics of the situation.
Kairos consists of many dimensions. While Isocrates taught the impor-
tance of being flexible and using practical wisdom to resolve contingencies
37
(the rhetorical dimension of kairos), the Pythagoreans saw kairos as justice,
which they viewed "as giving to each according to merit"38 (the ethical dimen-
sion of kairos). Aristotle defined equity (epieikeia) as kairic law by describing
it as "'justice that goes beyond the written law.' ' '39 Equity is situational
because "it is applied in particular circumstances, at specific times, to specific
situations not foreseen by the legislators."' As Aristotle states, "'it is equita-
ble to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to the letter of the law but to
the intention of the legislator; not to the action itself, but to the moral purpose;
not to the part, but to the whole."' 4 '
The renewed interest and scholarship by rhetoricians in the many dimen-
sions of kairos has intriguing potential for legal scholarship. Kairos can
inform our analysis of legal discourse through emphasis on situational contexts
and the Isocratean emphasis of training socially responsible citizens. As argued
in this article, kairos has particular relevance to takings jurisprudence.
B. Kairos in Takings Cases
Takings cases ask inherently kairic questions. Before considering the
legal issues raised in takings cases, it should be initially pointed out that the
cognates of "property" are also kairic. Eric Freyfogle traces these cognates to
include "proper," "appropriate," and "propriety" and argues that the linkage
between "property" and its cognates suggests the ethical dimension of land
ownership.42 Freyfogle explains that: "To own land within this linguistic tradi-
tion is to be charged with the responsibility for using it within the bounds of
community norms governing right and wrong land use. Owning land means
managing it appropriately, treating it properly, and abiding by local forms of
34 Id. at 8, 14-15.
31 Id. at 6-7.
36 Kinneavy, supra note 17, at 59 (quoting Doro Levi, II Kairos Attraverso la Letterature
greca, in RV 32 RENDICONTI DELLA REALE ACADEMIA NAZIONALE DE LINCEI CLASSE DI
SCIENZIA MoRALi 275 (1923)).
37 Id.
38 Kinneavy, supra note 21, at 87.
39 Kinneavy, supra note 17, at 68.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631, 638-39
(1996).
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propriety."43 Given that the line between ethos and kairos is often blurred,44
Freyfogle's point demonstrates that the cognates of property contain elements
of kairos in the Ciceronian emphasis on propriety and decorum. Discourse on
takings jurisprudence is likewise kairic.
The Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause prohibits the govern-
ment from taking private property for public use without just compensation and
is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Modem takings
case law typically involves not the physical taking of property, such as when
the government condemns a strip of land by eminent domain for a public high-
way, but rather, regulatory takings.
Regulatory taking is exemplified by the case of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.46 David Lucas successfully challenged the Beachfront Man-
agement Act, which prohibited him from building a single-family house on the
two lots for which he had paid almost a million dollars.4 7 The trial court deter-
mined that the act had rendered his beachfront lots valueless, and this finding
was not challenged. 48 The United States Supreme Court announced a categori-
cal test in Lucas that a taking occurs when a regulation "deprives land of all
economically beneficial use" and when "the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not
part of his title to begin with."4 9
The United States Supreme Court had earlier announced another categori-
cal rule in the case of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation
that if a regulation constitutes a permanent physical invasion, it is a taking.5°
While this categorical rule for permanent physical invasions is rarely applied,
the Court applied it in the recent case of Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash-
ington.5 ' Usually, however, regulations do not fall under either the Lucas or
Loretto categorical tests but are analyzed under the ad hoc test announced in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 5 2
41 Id. at 639.
44 See Amelie Frost Benedikt, On Doing the Right Thing at the Right Time: Toward an
Ethics of Kairos, in RHETORIC AND KAIROS, supra note 2, 226, 227 (considering the links
between kairos and ethics, and pointing out that "the right action at the wrong time is not
kairic... an action that is morally right at the present moment may not be so in the next").
45 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
239 (1897) (applying takings clause to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
'6 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
47 Id. at 1007-08.
48 Id. at 1020 n.9.
49 Id. at 1027.
50 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 n.16 (1982) (in
articulating this categorical rule, the Court commented that "whether the installation is a
taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a
breadbox").
51 Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003) (This is the IOLTA
case in which the Supreme Court held that there was a taking because "the transfer of inter-
est from the IOLTA account to the Foundation ... seems more akin to the occupation of a
small amount of rooftop space in Loretto."). The Court held that even though there was a
categorical taking, the property owners were not entitled to any compensation because their
net loss was zero.) Id. at 237-40.
52 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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In Penn Central, New York City denied Penn Central's application to
build a fifty-story building above its Grand Central Terminal because a fifty-
story building would be inconsistent with historic landmark preservation
laws.53 When Penn Central challenged the denial, the Supreme Court found no
unconstitutional taking.54 In short, the regulation did not go "too far" because
Penn Central still had use of Grand Central and because Penn Central could re-
submit plans for something less than fifty stories. Consequently, the Court
held that the regulation did not unduly interfere with reasonable investment-
backed expectations.56 Moreover, the character of the regulation was for the
public welfare because it encouraged the preservation of historic buildings.57
The decision pointed out that rarely do zoning laws result in takings, as long as
the laws are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare.58
Regulatory takings cases such as Penn Central ask whether the govern-
ment's regulation involving property has gone so far as to be a taking of prop-
erty requiring just compensation.59 The rules for analyzing regulatory takings
result in frustratingly inconsistent holdings, but these rules are consistently
stated case after case. In Palazzolo, for instance, the Supreme Court sets forth
the following:
First, we have observed, with certain qualifications .. . that a regulation which
"denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land" will require compensa-
tion under the Takings Clause .... Where a regulation places limitations on land that
fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may
have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's eco-
nomic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is
to prevent the government from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."60
Thus, in determining whether the government's regulation is a taking, the
court asks whether the regulation denies all economically beneficial use of the
land under the categorical Lucas test. 61 If it does not, analysis continues under
the three-factor Penn Central ad hoc test.62 Usually, the categorical test is not
applied, and as the Court indicated in Lucas, "[i]n 70-odd years of succeeding
53 Id. at 116-18.
54 Id. at 138.
55 Id. at 136-37.
56 Id.
57 Id. at Ill.
58 Id. at 129.
19 This Fifth Amendment takings issue is separate from the substantive due process issue of
whether the regulation is a legitimate exercise of police power to begin with. See, e.g.,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635 (2001); Doremus, supra note 5, at 13 (noting
the confusion which occurs when the court "awkwardly interminglets] the question of
whether compensation is required (the takings issue) and whether the challenged regulation
is valid (the substantive due process issue)").
60 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
61 As discussed above, fact patterns rarely result in an application of the categorical test
which considers whether the regulation constitutes a permanent physical taking. See discus-
sion supra at note 52.
62 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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'regulatory takings' jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any 'set
formula' for determining how far is too far."
63
The application of these legal tests in regulatory takings results in kairic
questions and determinations. The situational aspect of kairos is reflected in
these cases, which determine whether a changing situation, such as a new regu-
lation, has impinged on a landowner's property rights so much as to constitute a
taking. Justice Kennedy makes the point in Lucas that:
The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in
response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expecta-
tions whatever their source. The Takings Clause does not require a static body of
state property law; it protects private expectations to ensure private investment.
64
In other words, the Court must determine whether the case at hand
involves a right-timed regulation or whether the landowner is entitled to just
compensation (due measure). To determine just compensation or due measure
involves kairic notions of propriety: "the question is what has the owner lost,
not what has the taker gained,"65 and "[the owner] must be made whole but is
not entitled to more."6 6 Additionally, in determining just compensation claims
for land that may be divided into discrete parts, the Court has not resolved the
kairic issue of conceptual severance which asks, "what is the proper denomina-
tor in the takings fraction?
67
Although she does not specifically refer to kairos, Laura Underkuffler
argues that time is one of the necessary dimensions "for any legally cognizable
conception of property." 68 For instance, Underkuffler states that one "crucial"
question is "when were [the landowner's] rights - defined, as they are by
'existing law' - established? Were they established - and defined by 'existing
law' - at the time of purchase, at the time that the use of the land commenced,
or at some other time?' 69
Moreover, once property rights are established, are they forever fixed, or
do they change as state law changes?70 While the first question (when were the
landowner's rights established)'may be seen as a question of chronos because
the answer seems to depend on a specific point in time such as when a person
acquires property, an analysis of the first question might also involve kairos,
such as in the determination of whether relevant rights are excluded by back-
ground principles of law.7 1 The second question (whether these rights are fixed
or subject to change) will usually involve a question of kairos - because the
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1035.
65 Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 236 (2003) (quoting Boston Cham-
ber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
66 Id. (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
67 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (rejecting the claim that the wet-
lands could be separately considered from the uplands because the issue was not raised
below); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
68 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 5, at 28-29. She describes the four dimensions of property as
the theoretical dimension, spatial dimension, stringency of protection dimension, and time
dimension. Id. at 19-29.
69 Id. at 28.
70 Id. at 29.
71 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
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analysis of whether rights are frozen in linear time (chronos) or fluid and sub-
ject to change (kairos) - and is an underlying premise of takings decisions.72
Justice Holmes observed the kairic nature of takings in Pennsylvania Coal, in
which he posed the issue of social and legislative efficiency when he stated:
"government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. ' 7
In determining whether a regulation has gone so far as to constitute a
taking, courts apply either the categorical or the ad hoc tests. The application
of these tests involves kairos. While the Lucas categorical test may seem less
kairic than the ad hoc test in that the Lucas categorical test questions whether
all economically beneficial use of the property was eliminated, the analysis of
whether the regulation is not a taking because it advances a legitimate state
interest" involves a kairic weighing of due measure. As Justice Scalia com-
ments in Lucas, "whether one or the other of the competing characterizations
[the regulation as "harm-preventing" or "benefit-conferring"] will come to
one's lips in a particular case depends primarily upon one's evaluation of the
worth of competing uses of real estate. ' 75 Justice Scalia goes on to argue that
the determination cannot rely solely on "whether the legislation has recited a
harm-preventing justification... [because] this amounts to a test of whether the
legislation has a stupid staff."' 76 Thus, the kairic consideration built into the
Lucas categorical test questions whether "the proscribed use interests were not
part of [the landowner's] title to begin with." 77
Questions of kairos are more transparent in the Penn Central ad hoc test
which balances considerations. Economic impact and investment-backed
expectations factors contain kairic elements of right-timing and due measure,
as does the character of the government action, especially the consideration of
the propriety of the government action.78
In Palazzolo, a case which involved wetlands regulation,79 the two issues
before the Supreme Court were ripeness and notice,80 each of which involve
72 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 5.
73 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
74 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024.
15 Id. at 1025 (stating that "[w]hether Lucas's construction-of single-family residences on
his parcels should be described as bringing 'harm' to South Carolina's adjacent ecological
resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that the State's use
interest in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent use must
yield").
76 Id. 1025 n.12.
77 Id. at 1027.
78 See supra text accompanying 
-notes 115, 158.
79 Beach areas "along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts always have been unstable, dynamic
places." Dana Beach and Kim Diana Connolly, A Retrospective on Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: Public Policy Implications for the 21st Century, 12 SOUTHEASTERN EVL.
L.J. 1 (2003). Thus, takings involving beach areas are perhaps more kairic than geologically
stable areas.
80 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001); see also William M. Hof, Trying to
Halt the Procedural Merry-Go-Round: The Ripeness of Regulatory Takings Claims After
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 833 (2002) (analyzing the ripeness issue in
takings cases).
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kairos. Ripeness, of course, is not limited to takings cases, but is a considera-
tion applicable to all cases. It is the quintessential timing question of a lawsuit.
One aspect of ripeness is whether there has been a final judgment or adminis-
trative determination.8" If the case is not ripe because there is no final determi-
nation, it is dismissed and the petitioner does not have right-timing to bring a
claim. Although ripeness appears to be a simple question of chronos (when did
the agency make a final determination?), ripeness can also be a question of
kairos under the futility exception when the court holds that a case is ripe even
though there is not a final determination because it would be futile to obtain a
final determination.82 Further, the very issue of ripeness poses the kairic ques-
tion of the appropriateness of bringing a claim under extant circumstances.
The other issue discussed in Palazzolo is notice.83 This issue asks
whether a person who acquires property with notice of a regulation is entitled
to make a takings claim based on that regulation.84 The question of notice
raises many kairic questions that courts analyze, as discussed below: does
notice destroy the new owner's right-timing and due measure to bring a takings
challenge? If the court holds that notice bars a takings claim, does that violate
decorum by entitling the state to a windfall? If the claim is allowed, does that
usurp wise moderation by allowing a future title-holder to bring a takings claim
that is manufactured? So, while takings claims ask questions that involve
kairos, justices approach these questions employing different rhetorics of It's
Mine and Let's Share, which is the second part of the argument.
III. COMPETING RHETORICS
Rose describes takings cases as a "muddle" and as "chaotic" because they
constitute compromises between the competing considerations of common
resources and individual expectations.8 ' Although takings cases are com-
promises, the muddle can also be explained by recognizing that judges employ
competing rhetorics in resolving cases - arriving at their resolutions by
approaching "invention, structure, style, occasion, [and] audience" from dif-
ferent perspectives, or rhetorics.86 Often these competing rhetorics do not
acknowledge each other because "we don't see our own rhetoric; it is already
normality," much less the competing rhetoric of others.87 If we acknowledge
competing rhetorics at all, "they are likely to seem whimsical, odd, uninformed,
selfish, wrong, mad, even alien."88 Consequently, "[t]he existence of multiple
rhetorics entails their competition., 89 The discourse of takings cases consists
81 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618.
82 See id. at 620.
83 Id. at 618.
4 Id.
85 Rose, supra note 4, at 20.
86 Jim W. Corder, From Rhetoric Into Other Studies, in DEFINING THE NEW RHETORICS 95,
98 (Theresa Enos & Stuart C. Brown eds., 1993).
87 Id.
88 Id. This may be especially true of Justice Scalia's rhetoric in his dissents. See e.g.,
Michael Frost, Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's
Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 Ky. L.J. 167 (2002-2003).
89 Corder, supra note 86, at 102.
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of the competing rhetorics of It's Mine, which is past-oriented, and Let's Share,
which is future-oriented. The emphasis or rejection of kairos plays an impor-
tant role in shaping takings rhetoric, with its Aristotelian and Sophistic roots.
This section describes these Greek roots, and also describes two modem paral-
lels in the takings scholarship of Carol Rose and Laura Underkuffler.
A. Let's Share and It's Mine - Rhetorics of Possibility and Actuality
Let's Share and It's Mine are competing rhetorics in takings jurispru-
dence. Let's Share is a Sophistic approach that emphasizes kairos, the future,
and contingency.9 ° It's Mine is an Aristotelian approach that emphasizes chro-
nos, the past, and custom.91 Let's Share uses practical wisdom to resolve con-
tingencies and shape the future, while It's Mine uses precedent or custom to
freeze the past. Let's Share views property rights as fluid and flexible; It's
Mine views property rights as static and immutable.
Before examining these rhetorics in the context of takings cases, it is help-
ful to consider the distinction between Sophistic and Aristotelain rhetorics.
John Poulakos, a well-known scholar in the history of rhetoric, has described
the differences between these rhetorics and argues that the Isocratean (or
Sophistic) emphasis on kairos results in the rhetoric of possibility, in contrast
with the Aristotelian rhetoric of actuality. 92 Poulakos also compares the rheto-
rics' differing emphases on potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia).9 3
Aristotelian rhetoric emphasizes actuality, "the world as it is ... in the
actuality of facts or events and their proof."94 Aristotle's system "assumes that
the world can be known and reproduced accurately by linguistic means" and
that the primary goal of rhetoric is not persuasion, although rhetoric can affect
human actions "through the force of relevant factual evidence and valid
proof."95 The rhetoric of actuality "affirms custom and habit as the founda-
tions of social and individual behavior," and sees the future as a "natural exten-
sion of the present." 96 "In short, the rhetoric of actuality is a situational
rhetoric that approaches man as he is in his present predicament.
97
The Sophists' rhetoric of possibility, in contrast, is not grounded in the
"ability to know the world as it is" or in "any correspondence between objec-
tive reality and language," but in potentiality.98 "Theirs is a constantly
changing world, full of ambiguity and uncertainty, always lacking, never com-
90 See Poulakos, supra note 9, at 223-24.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 217. Poulakos points out that it is difficult for us to understand the Sophists in their
own terms "because our present views on rhetoric have been conditioned mostly by Aris-
totle." Id. at 216.
93 Id. at 217.
94 Id. at 218. Poulakos describes Aristotle as focusing on matter, facts, on what is there:
"Unlike his predecessors, who posit the world as it is not (Sophists) or a world that ought to
be (Plato), Aristotle's starting point is the world as it is, in its positive structure and tenden-
cies." Id.
95 Id. at 223.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 218.
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plete."99 A fact, for the Sophists, is not closed and finalized, but subject to
perception and interpretation, and thus "remains open, unfinished, recurring
each time it is recounted. ' ' 1° The Sophistic rhetoric of possibility "assumes an
incomplete universe," and has persuasion as its primary goal.' It strives to
present the possible, an absent reality, not through elaborate proofs, but through
figurative discourse which seeks to envision what is not known, felt, or under-
stood."0 2 The rhetoric of possibility challenges familiar values and beliefs and
sees the past as an "obstacle[ ] to the future."' 3 The rhetoric of possibility
"underscores the fluid aspects of human existence."'"' Thus, kairos plays a
key role in the rhetoric of the Sophists by envisioning the possible through
practical wisdom appropriate for the particular circumstances.
Takings discourse employs these competing rhetorics. What I call "Let's
Share" rhetoric is Sophistic because it envisions property rights as open and
fluid, and does not rely exclusively on precedent and the past, but on kairos and
on the contingency of the situation. On the other hand, what I call "It's Mine"
rhetoric is Aristotelian in its emphasis on property rights as frozen in time
(chronos) and on custom and precedent to shape the future.
Let's Share rhetoric tends to accept the kairic nature of takings issues, and
It's Mine rhetoric tends to reject this kairic nature. For instance, legal scholars
and judges who approach the takings muddle by proposing uniform or categori-
cal rules are more likely to employ It's Mine rhetoric than are legal scholars
and judges who accept (and perhaps contribute to) the muddle. 0 5 Acceptance
of the muddle is illustrated by the characterization of takings jurisprudence as
follows: "Understood functionally, when the Court holds that a regulation
effects a taking, it is signaling that the legislature has tried to accelerate change
faster than the Justices believe fair or wise.' ' 10 6 This characterization demon-
strates Let's Share rhetoric because it emphasizes kairos and change. The
question of what is fair or wise overlaps with the ethical dimension of kairos
and is an important undercurrent in takings cases. As seen below in the discus-
sion of competing rhetorics in Palazzolo, It's Mine often results in what is fair
to me, as an individual property owner, while Let's Share often results in what
99 Id. at 221.
100 Id.
1o Id. at 223.
102 Id. at 223-24.
103 Id. at 224.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Kraig Odabashian, Investment-Backed Expectations and the Politics of Judi-
cial Articulation: The Reintegration of History and the Lockean Mind in Contemporary
American Jurisprudence, 50 UCLA L. REv. 641, 646-47, 653 (2002). Odabashian criticizes
"the Court's inability to determine a uniform definition of investment-backed expectations"
and describes Holmes' rule set forth in Pennsylvania Coal as "achiev[ing] a nearly diabolical
level of subtlety," which should be replaced by Scalia's proposal for a "baseline definition"
of "those expectations rooted in the historical moment at which the Just Compensation
Clause was conceived." Id. at 668; see also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the
Rules of Law: Teaching Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 713, 715
(2002) (distinguishing rules and regulations in takings cases and pointing out that "[c]lass
discussions of the difference between rules and standards illuminates not only takings law
but also basic styles of legal reasoning that students will use throughout their careers").
"o Hulsebosch, supra note 105, at 732.
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is fair for the common good.107 The emphasis on the common good follows
from the Isocratean view.
B. Parallel Tracks: The Views of Carol Rose and Laura Underkuffler
Two legal scholars, Carol Rose and Laura Underkuffler, have described
competing views of property in takings cases, and their views form parallel
tracks to Let's Share and It's Mine rhetorics.
1. Rose's Utilitarian and Historic Views of Property
In Property and Persuasion, Carol Rose argues that the "muddle" or
inconsistency in takings law "stems from its reflection of two complete but
different ideas about what property is good for:" one idea is the utilitarian idea
of property as preference satisfactions and the other is the historical idea of
property as propriety.1 0 8  These views are parallel (but not identical) to It's
Mine and Let's Share rhetorics.
Under the utilitarian view of property as preference satisfactions, takings
are seen to "violate the very purpose of a property regime, namely to increase
the size of the bag of goods or... the size of the pie." 1° 9 The utilitarian view
of property as preference satisfactions employs It's Mine rhetoric when it
"call[s] certain things 'property rights' and foster[s] the expectation that owners
can control and enjoy the things they have worked for in order to encourage
both rich and poor to invest the labor, time, energy, and effort that will make
resources more valuable and the total bag bigger."" 0 This expectation, like It's
Mine rhetoric, freezes property rights in terms of the past.
Even though the utilitarian view primarily parallels It's Mine rhetoric, its
justifications for takings also contain a hint of Let's Share rhetoric to the extent
that utilitarians view sharing as maximizing the size of the pie, so property
rights are not completely frozen, but subject to some change. 1 ' Thus, the utili-
tarian view justifies takings "on the understanding that public management of
certain projects is more wealth-enhancing than private management would
be," '" 2 and it "reduces[s] the demoralization" of public takings by providing
compensation to property owners. 13 Nonetheless, the utilitarian view prima-
rily uses It's Mine rhetoric because it focuses on past expectations. Property
owners resist regulations because they believe their property rights include the
right to do what they have done in the past, as Rose points out in what she calls
"the Utilitarian Dilemma:" "The dilemma is that the essential goal of securing
o See F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the
Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 121, 138 (2003) (describing the shift from Lucas to Palazzolo and
Tahoe-Sierra as "a shift from 'regulator bashing' to an endorsement of 'good' planning").
108 RosE, supra note 1, at 64.
109 Id.
" Id. at 56.
"' Id. at 53-54.
112 Id. at 57.
113 Id. at 56.
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property expectations clashes with the essential goal of managing congested
resources." 14 The landowners' resistance shows an It's Mine approach.
Rose contrasts the utilitarian view with a historic view of property as
"what is 'proper' or appropriate... that which is needed to keep good order in
the commonwealth or body politic."'1 5 The view of property as proper empha-
sizes the kairos of Let's Share rhetoric. Rose explains that the historic view of
property does not necessarily view takings as violating the purpose of a prop-
erty regime because "the legislature's imposition on the property may be
treated as a legitimate demand on a citizen, so long as the citizen's decent and
proper income is preserved." ' 1 6 The view of property as proper is kairic
because it emphasizes propriety, or kairos as prepons.1 17 The historic view
parallels Let's Share rhetoric because of its emphasis on kairos and its under-
standing of property rights as flexible, depending on a balance between the
needs of the individual and the community.
2. Underkuffler's Common Conception and Operative Conception
Like Rose's discussion of property as preference satisfactions and prop-
erty as proper, Laura Underkuffler, in The Idea of Property, discusses two
competing conceptions of property found in takings cases. 18 Her project
develops an approach that explores "what property. . . really is." '1 19 She argues
that "a legally cognizable conception of property can be constructed" only by
considering four dimensions: theoretical, spatial, stringency of protection, and
temporal.' 2 ° Her analysis uncovers two conceptions of property: the common
conception of property and the operative conception of property, which, respec-
tively parallel It's Mine and Let's Share. The common conception of property
is based on fixed notions of property. 121 Underkuffler explains:
114 Rose, supra note 4, at 17-19.
115 ROSE, supra note 1, at 58; see also Freyfogle, supra note 42, at 638-39 (tracing cognates
of "property").
116 ROSE, supra note 1, at 65. Myrl Duncan similarly discusses historic views of property,
but contrasts the historic, agrarian view of property as a bundle of sticks ("a priori, unchang-
ing and unchangeable . . . essentially private in nature") with the older, medieval view of
property as connected. Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Com-
munity-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 781-783 (2002). Duncan criticizes the bundle of
sticks metaphor because it "treats a landowner's collection of rights only in the abstract. By
considering the bundle complete in and of itself, the metaphor ignores the fact that landown-
ers, and thus bundles, interact not only with neighboring landowners but with the public at
large in ways that affect society's desire and need for a healthy environment." Id. at 775. In
other words, Duncan might argue that the expectations Rose describes stem from the use of
this metaphor. Indeed, Duncan argues that the property class should be restructured to
emphasize the interconnectedness - the bundle as part of a cord. Id. at 799, 804-5. See also
Myrl L. Duncan, Property as Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for
Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENvTL. L. 1095, 1105-1109 (1996)
(tracing the property paradigm common in the middle ages with the view that "the mineral,
plant and animal kingdoms were seen as inseparable elements of the web of life" and that
property ownership was "limited by social obligations").
117 See supra text accompanying note 29.
118 UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 6, at 5. Chapters 3 & 4 develop these theories.
1'9 Id. at 11.
120 Id. at 5.
121 Id at 45.
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Property rights, under this understanding, protect an area of individual autonomy and
control. They protect individual interests that are, as an essential matter, defined by
dimensions of theory and space; protected equally; and protected from collective
change thereafter. The individual interests protected by property are presumptively
superior to competing public interests. They can be overridden (without legal conse-
quence) by public interests of a particularly dire or compelling nature, but only by
interests of that nature. They cannot be overridden by the simple or routine goals of
government. 122
Under this common conception, property rights "have great presumptive
power," 123 are frozen in time and protected against collective change.'
2 4
Moreover, the common conception requires that there must be "some moment
in time . . . for the establishment of property's protected rights."' 125 In other
words, property rights in this view depend on chronos, not kairos. Thus, the
common conception parallels It's Mine rhetoric because past visions of prop-
erty as "It's Mine" on the bases of chronos, custom, and habit, influence future
decisions about property.
Underkuffler describes a competing view of property as the operative con-
ception, which "envisions change as part of the idea of property. ' 126 Under the
operative conception, "property represents individual interests, fluid in time,
established and re-established as circumstances warrant."' 127 The operative
conception of property does not give individual property rights presumptive
power over collective rights: "'[p]roperty,' in this case, does not represent the
individual's interest, alone; rather, it represents the outcome of individual/col-
lective tensions, determined and redetermined as circumstances warrant. As a
consequence, individual claims - even if protected in the past - are afforded no
special or assumed right to continued legal protection."
128
Similar to the historic view of property as proper that Rose describes, the
operative conception is consistent with a rhetoric of possibility, a vision of
property as the rhetoric of Let's Share, based on changing, not static, considera-
tions for the larger community. 129 In this view, practical wisdom shapes out-
comes based on changing times and needs. The Isocratean emphasis on social
justice would mean that a socially responsible individual would not expect his
or her property to remain "mine" in the face of greater social need, but would
defer to the collective.' 30 This would result in due measure, or kairos.
Underkuffler's two conceptions of property more closely parallel Let's
Share and It's Mine rhetorics than do the historical distinctions drawn by CarolRose. Underkuffler's goal is normative;3 she provides a complex theory
"which explains, predicts, and justifies the variable power of claimed individ-
122 Id.
123 Id. at 46.
124 id. at 50-51.
125 Id. at 40.
126 Id. at 48.
127 Id. at 51.
128 Id. at 62.
129 Id.
130 See Sipiora, supra note 2, at 8; Kinneavy, supra note 17, at 65.
131 UNDERKtUFFLER, supra note 6, at 33.
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ual property rights." '132 Her thorough analysis develops the common concep-
tion and operative conception of property in takings cases. 133 She argues that
the use of the common conception is "inappropriate"' 134 because "[i]f the com-
mon conception of property is used, individual interests are afforded strict pro-
tection. If the operative conception is used, individual interests are - as a
practical matter - afforded none." 135 The present approach differs from
Underkuffler's primarily because her goal is to develop a theory of what prop-
erty "really is," while the goal here is to examine the rhetoric judges employ to
decide takings cases. The next part of this article draws on Underkuffler's and
Rose's work, but performs a rhetorical analysis of competing It's Mine and
Let's Share rhetorics in the recent United States Supreme Court decision of
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.
13 6
This analysis does not offer a normative or a historical approach, but
rather examines how judges respond to the situation of a regulatory takings
case. Kairos is used as a way to read both the issues raised in takings cases and
the judicial decisions in those cases. A rhetorical reading complicates and
explains the famously inconsistent "muddle" of regulatory takings jurispru-
dence. Because the issues in takings cases are kairic, judges respond to chang-
ing situations inconsistently. Judges pen majority, concurring, and dissenting
decisions that illustrate competing tensions of Let's Share and It's Mine rheto-
rics. Moreover, a particular judge might author a decision or a string of deci-
sions that variously employ It's Mine or Let's Share rhetoric, or both; however,
one rhetoric will dominate over the others in a particular case or decision. Such
a rhetorical reading makes room for the complications of takings case law and
explains the tension found in these cases.
IV. PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND
A. Background of Palazzolo
Before considering the Supreme Court's analysis of notice and ripeness, a
summary of the chronos or background facts of the case is in order. In 1959,
Anthony Palazzolo bought three undeveloped waterfront lots, approximately
twenty acres in total, in Westerly, Rhode Island.' 3 7 Title to the lots was actu-
ally held by Shore Gardens, Inc., the corporation which Palazzolo formed.'38
The lots were bordered by the "popular" Misquamicut State Beach, "a lengthy
expanse of coastline facing Block Island Sound and beyond to the Atlantic
Ocean," and by Winnapaug Pond, "an intertidal inlet often used by residents for
132 Id. at 4.
133 Id. at Chaps. 3 & 4. Her analysis focuses primarily on Lucas.
134 Id. at 53.
135 Id. at 54. She further explains, "[u]nder the operative conception of property, the idea of
property, itself, confers no rights; it simply describes, or mediates, the tensions between
individual interests and collective goals, which are resolved and re-resolved as circumstances
warrant." Id.
136 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
137 Id. at 613. The exact acreage was not known because Palazzolo did not have an accurate
survey. See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 710 n.1 (R.I. 2000); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
654 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
138 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 613.
[Vol. 5:615
THE RHETORICS OF TAKINGS CASES
boating, fishing, and shellfishing."' 3 9 The three lots were primarily wetlands
("salt marsh subject to tidal flooding") and would require up to six feet of fill
before the land could support structures.1 40 "[A] substantial amount" of the
land was "under the waters of Winnipaug Pond" or "subject to daily tidal inun-
dation."4' Approximately two acres consisted of uplands.
1 42
Over the next twenty-five years, Shore Gardens or Palazzolo made five
applications to state agencies for permission to fill and develop all or part of the
property. 43 Each application was denied." The first three applications were
denied in the 1960s.145 The third application was initially approved by the
Department of Natural Resources, but it withdrew approval within a year.
146
Before the fourth application, two important events occurred. First, the
federal and state governments passed legislation to protect coastal wetlands and
salt marshes (such as the land in this case) in 197 1.147 Second, Shore Gardens
failed to pay corporate income taxes in 1978 and its corporate charter was
revoked.148 Thus, by operation of law, Palazzolo became title owner of the
three lots and, more significantly, he acquired title after the passage of,
and with notice of, the wetlands legislation. 149 Palazzolo's fourth application
to fill the entire property was denied in 1983 and he did not appeal the
determination.'
50
His last application in 1985 was for permission to fill eleven wetland acres
to build a beach club. 151  Again, the agency denied the application, but this
time Palazzolo challenged the determination, and when the decision was
139 Id.
140 Id. at 613-14.
141 Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 710.
142 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
143 Id. at 613-15.
144 Id. Initially, there were no wetlands regulations; however, there were regulations
regarding dredging the pond, the action which Palazzolo originally requested. See Palaz-
zolo, 746 A.2d at 710.
145 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 613-14.
146 Id. at 614. In a speech given after the decision was issued, Palazzolo's attorney, James
Burling, humorously gave a practice tip: "when you have a client.., and your client has a
permit, you must tell that client to exercise that permit ... quickly .... And Mr. Palazzolo
made the great mistake ... he sat on his rights for too long, and he did not immediately rush
in with the bulldozers .... Symposium, Property Rights After Palazzolo, 24 U. HAw. L.
REv. 455, 460 (2002).
147 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614. When Palazzolo bought the land, it was common to fill the
wetlands "as a means of putting 'waste' areas to beneficial agricultural use"; but ecological
concerns drove state and federal legislation when it became apparent that wetlands "provided
valuable ecosystem services including water filtration and flood control." See Doremus,
supra note 5, at 18. A few houses had been built on the wetlands adjacent to Palazzolo's
land. See James S. Burling, Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation: Implications of
Palazzolo on Eminent Domain, SG059 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 351, 354-55 (2002).
148 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614. Palazzolo's attorney at the Supreme Court, James S. Burl-
ing, explained during a symposium that "Mr. Palazzolo was tired of paying $100 a year
corporation registration fee, so he stopped paying the money." Symposium, supra note 146,
at 461.
149 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614.
150 Id. at 614-15. The Council cited vagueness and impact on the wetlands as basis for
denial. Id.
151 Id. at 615.
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affirmed, he brought an inverse condemnation action claiming damages in
excess of three million dollars. 15 2 He claimed that the agency's action
constituted a total taking of his property without just compensation under a
Lucas analysis.153 The Rhode Island Superior Court held that his taking claim
was not ripe for review and, in the alternative, denied Palazzolo's claim.' 54
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. 55 However, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded in a decision containing a majority
opinion, three concurring opinions, and two dissenting opinions.' 5 6 Although
it did not hold that there had been a total taking, the Court remanded to the state
court to determine whether there had been a taking under the Penn Central
test. 157 An analysis of the Court's decision shows kairos in the Court's
description of the land and the competing Let's Share/It's Mine rhetorics in the
Court's ruling on the issues of notice and ripeness.
B. Kairic Land Use: "a most disagreeable 'beach club' , 8
The decision displays a sense of kairos as propriety or decorum in describ-
ing the land. Justice Kennedy's interesting description of the history and natu-
ral features of the land' 59 can be contrasted with his and Justice Ginsburg's
disapproving description of the proposed beach club.' 60
Justice Kennedy begins the majority decision with the "precarious, though
colorful, early history" of Westerly, Rhode Island. 16 ' This history is an exam-
ple of both chronos (the historical progression of events) and kairos (the
town's progression toward order and decorum). Justice Kennedy explains that
in the seventeenth century, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts all
fought over land boundaries, including the ownership of Westerly, and that
these "jurisdictional squabbles" were not settled until a 1728 compact, when
"the town's development was more orderly, and with some historic distinc-
tion." 62 Kennedy goes on to note the strategic importance of Westerly's
Watch Hill Point in the Revolutionary War and The War of 1812, and the later
importance of Westerly as a "popular vacation and seaside destination" due to
its geographic features,16 3 described in the "happy account" given by "[o]ne of
the town's historians":
The broad beaches of clean white sand dip gently toward the sea; there are no
odorous marshes at low tide, no railroad belches smoke, and the climate is unrivalled
152 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 86-1496, 1995 WL 941370, at *1
(R.I Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615-16.
153 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615.
154 Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 1995 WL 941370, at *7; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
155 Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 717.
156 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 647 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 612-13.
160 Id. at 615; id. at 647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 612.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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on the coast, that of Newport only excepted .... When Providence to the north runs
a temperature of 90, the mercury in this favored spot remains at 77.164
Westerly, as depicted by Justice Kennedy, is a Norman Rockwell vision of
decorum.
In contrast to the decorum of the land's natural resources, both Justice
Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg find a striking lack of decorum in Palazzolo's
proposed beach club, which formed the basis of two of his applications, includ-
ing the one ultimately appealed. 165 Justice Kennedy describes the proposed
beach club as follows: "The details do not tend to inspire the reader with an
idyllic coastal image, for the proposal was to fill 11 acres of the property with
gravel to accommodate '50 cars with boat trailers, a dumpster, port-a-johns,
picnic tables, barbecue pits of concrete, and other trash receptacles.' ,166 Ken-
nedy' s picture of the beach club shatters the Rockwell vision of the area's natu-
ral resources. Likewise, Justice Ginsburg contrasts "[alpproximately 18 acres
... [of] wetlands that sustain a rich but delicate ecosystem" with the proposal
for "a most disagreeable 'beach club.'
167
The negative reaction to Palazzolo's intended use raises the speculation of
whether the outcome would have differed had Palazzolo applied for a more
idyllic or modest beach club. Although this question cannot be answered, Jus-
tice Kennedy's and Justice Ginsberg's opinions emphasize the propriety dimen-
sion of kairos.
168
C. The Notice Issue
In analyzing the issue of notice, Justice Kennedy, 169 Justice Scalia, 170 and
Justice Stevens 17 1 write opinions that employ It's Mine rhetoric. All three
decisions are metaphorical, 172 formalistic and inflexible, and rely on custom
and the past to shape the future. It's Mine rhetoric views property rights as
164 Id.
165 Id. at 614-15. James Burling jokes about Ginsburg's and Kennedy's ideas of the ideal
beach club, and at one points jests that Kennedy does not seem likely to be one to take a six
pack of beer to the beach club. Symposium, supra note 146, at 461-62.
166 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615.
167 Id. at 646-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
168 Similarly, Justice Stevens emphasized the propriety dimension of kairos in his descrip-
tion of Lake Tahoe. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 307 (2002) ("All agree that Lake Tahoe is 'uniquely beautiful,' that President
Clinton was right to call it a 'national treasure that must be protected and preserved,' and
that Mark Twain aptly described the clarity of its waters as 'not merely transparent, but
dazzlingly, brilliantly so."') (citation omitted)).
169 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 611. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in Ken-
nedy's majority opinion, but did not file concurring opinions. However, in other recent
cases, such as Tahoe-Sierra, Rehnquist and Thomas have employed It's Mine rhetoric.
Focusing on the chronos of the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "denial of all viable
use of land for six years is a taking." Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
170 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 637-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172 Poulakos, supra note 9, at 223. The use of figurative speech is traditionally more
closely associated with the rhetoric of possibility rather than actuality; however, almost all of
the opinions in Palazzolo contain figurative speech, and takings cases seem to inspire meta-
phor and simile, such as Justice Blackmun's initial sentence in his Lucas dissent that
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frozen in time. In contrast, Justice O'Connor's concurrence 173 uses Let's Share
rhetoric, emphasizing contingency and kairos, and viewing property rights as
fluid and shaped by circumstances. As this section also argues, part of Justice
Stevens' dissent may be read as employing Let's Share rhetoric. 1
74
1. Justice Kennedy's Opinion: "The State may not put so potent a
Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle. "175
Justice Kennedy's majority decision holds that acquiring property with
notice of the wetlands regulations did not estop Palazzolo from filing a takings
claim. 176 This section argues that Kennedy's It's Mine rhetoric is informed by
a traditional view of property as a bundle of sticks or rights that cannot be taken
by the state unless dire circumstances exist.17 7 He views property rights as
fixed in the past, and places importance on custom when he says that it would
unacceptably alter the "nature of property" to hold that notice barred a takings
claim.
178
Before Palazzolo, jurisdictions were split on the issue of whether acquir-
ing property with notice of a regulation would bar a takings claim.' 79 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court followed the view that notice barred Palazzolo's
Lucas claim because when Palazzolo acquired the lots in 1978, the regulations
were already in effect. Accordingly, the bundle of rights acquired "did not
include the right to develop the lots without restrictions." 8' The Rhode Island
court also held that notice barred a takings claim under the ad hoc test be-
cause Palazzolo "had no reasonable investment-backed expectations that were
affected by this regulation." 8"
The Palazzolo holding resolved lower court uncertainty about the effect of
notice on a takings claim. Justice Kennedy reasons that holding that notice
barred Palazzolo's takings claim would give the state a windfall by allowing it
"to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause." '182 Thus, he rejects a kairic
vision of property rights, and of the state's authority as fluid, and rejects the
notion of a time-bar for a takings claim. Kennedy labels the Rhode Island
court's holding as "quixotic," meaning "caught up [like Don Quixote] in the
"[tioday the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
173 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 627.
176 Id. at 632.
177 See Duncan, supra note 116, at 787 (discussing the static nature of bundle of sticks
metaphor); UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 6, at 45 (arguing that under the common conception,
property rights cannot "be overridden" except "by public interests of a particularly dire or
compelling nature").
178 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
179 See Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and Environ-
mental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 337, 347-51 (2003).
1o Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
noted that "Palazzolo was unable to cite a single case in which a court has ordered compen-
sation for a regulatory taking when the claimant became the owner of the property after the
regulation became effective." Id.
181 Id. at 717.
182 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
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romance of noble deeds or unreachable ideals; romantic without regard to prac-
ticality."' 183 Justice Kennedy calls the holding of the Rhode Island court "quix-
otic" because it would impractically change the "nature of property."
184
However, Kennedy's holding is arguably just as "quixotic" because either rule
about notice is fraught with practical concerns about who may reap a windfall.
As Justice O'Connor argues, Kennedy's holding could also result in impracti-
calities and windfalls if a new owner of land could claim a taking based on an
already-existing regulation.
185
Perhaps the real reason Kennedy rejects the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's ruling is not because it is "quixotic," but because it is contrary to It's
Mine rhetoric, which Kennedy metaphorically expresses as: "The State may
not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle."18 6 This meta-
phor somewhat cryptically expresses his natural law view of frozen property
rights that must be protected from the sovereign's potent stick.187 He offers his
metaphor in response to what he summarizes as the opposing view: "Property
rights are created by the State .... So... by prospective legislation the State
can shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations, and subsequent owners cannot claim any injury from lost value."'18 8 In
rejecting this view as giving the State too much power, Kennedy's metaphor
alludes to the polarized stances of Hobbes and Locke.189
Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, published in 1651, describes the necessity of
an all-powerful state or sovereign, "the great LEVIATHAN called a COM-
MONWEALTH."'190 The distribution of property lies in the sovereign's
power, 191 and individuals may not "exclude their sovereign" from their land,
although they may "exclude all other subjects. '"'92 Hobbes gives the sovereign
a potent stick over property rights.
183 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1073 (New College ed. 1980).
'8' Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
185 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at
716. Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, acknowledges the possibility of "manufac-
ture[d]" takings claims, but dismisses this possibility because "I do not see how a constitu-
tional provision concerned with 'fairness and justice' . . . could reward any such strategic
behavior." Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Doremus, supra note
5, at 37-39 (arguing that the Rhode Island court decided the notice issue correctly because to
hold otherwise would give the buyer a windfall; she also analyzes the notice issue using a
kairic emphasis on "the passage of time").
186 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
187 Id. at 627.
188 Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
189 Id. at 627. Justice Kennedy's metaphor also contains phallic imagery in both the "potent
• ..Hobbesian stick" and in the "Lockean bundle." See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix
Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV.
239, 241-44, 254-55 (1994) (arguing that the bundle of sticks metaphor is an inevitable
phallic symbol because of our "psychoanalytic tendency to collapse the Symbolic into the
Real... we envision property in terms of the archetype of the penis and the female body. In
the former manifestation, we imagine property as a physical object we see, hold, and wield.
In the latter manifestation, we imagine it as a physical object we either protect from invasion
or occupy and enjoy").
190 THOMAS HOnnES, LEVIATHAN 3 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1994).
191 Id. at 160.
192 Id. at 161.
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In contrast, Locke does not give the sovereign such a potent stick. John
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, published in 1689, contains the classic
definition of property in Chapter Five of the Second Treatise:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man
has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state
Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the
common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of
the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least
where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. 193
Locke argues that the concept of a sovereign state arose through a social com-
pact motivated by the need to protect private property. He writes:
[T]hough in the state of nature he hath such a right [of absolute freedom over his
person and property], yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly
exposed to the invasion of others . . .the enjoyment of the property he has in this
state is very unsafe, very unsecure .... This makes him willing to... join in society
with others ... for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which
I call by the general name "property."
194
Even though people join together in a state, the traditional reading of Locke
emphasizes that the state does not have absolute power over property because
property existed before the social contract.195
Kennedy's metaphorical reference to Hobbes and Locke follows this tradi-
tional reading of the rejection of a potent sovereign in favor of individualism.
Thus, Kennedy's majority decision regarding notice demonstrates an It's Mine
rhetoric grounded in the view of property based not on kairos and change, but
on inflexible and timeless principles.19 6
193 JOHN LocKE, Two TREATrISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
194 Id. at 350.
195 See Burling, supra note 147, at 359 (Burling, who represented Palazzolo at the Supreme
Court, summarizes this traditional view of Locke and Hobbes as follows: "Locke was
emphatic that property remained the right and prerogative of the people, and that government
may not take property ... Hobbes supported his view that property and liberty resided in the
government with an argument of necessity, noting that without government there would be
no property and not much to life"). But see Duncan, supra note 116, at 1097-98 (providing
an alternative view). Duncan discusses the interpretation of "neo-Lockeans" who "would
have us believe that Locke's theory of individualism was so central to the thought of the
Founders that, more than two hundred years later, it acts to make virtually every uncompen-
sated restriction on the use of private property a 'taking."' Id. at 1097. Duncan observes
that the "neo-Lockeans" use Locke's theories in their "agenda to disarm the regulatory
state." Id. However, Duncan argues that the interpretation of Locke that emphasizes indi-
vidualism is subject to debate, and "that numerous political theorists reject the traditional
reading of Locke. These modem scholars of Locke read him as arguing that once humans
have entered into society, property becomes conventional, to be defined by the positive law."
Id. at 1098.
196 Justice Kennedy's view in Palazzolo indicates a shift from his view in Lucas that "[t]he
Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law" and that it "does not
eliminate the police power of the State to enact limitations on the use of their property" "in a
complex and interdependent society." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
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2. Justice Scalia's Opinion: The "government-as-thief' 19 7
Justice Kennedy's It's Mine rhetoric pales in comparison to Justice
Scalia's concurring decision, which places even more emphasis on individual
property rights that are frozen in time. 9 8 Justice Scalia pens what Justice
O'Connor calls his "government-as-thief' simile.1 99 Justice Scalia is not as
disturbed by the potential windfall an individual owner with notice might
accrue in winning a takings claim, as he is by the government's potential wind-
fall.2 ° ° He writes:
there is nothing to be said for giving it [the windfall] instead to the government -
which not only did not lose something it owned, but is both the cause of the miscar-
riage of "fairness" and the only one of the three parties involved in the miscarriage
(government, naive original owner, and sharp real estate developer) which acted
unlawfully - indeed unconstitutionally.2 ° 1
Justice Scalia's "government-as-thief" simile is grounded in It's Mine
rhetoric similar to that of Justice Kennedy - both reject notice as barring a
takings claim because that would give the government a windfall and usurp the
landowner's fixed property rights. However, Justice Scalia goes even further
than Justice Kennedy by holding that notice should have no bearing whatsoever
on a takings analysis.20 2 While Justice Kennedy remands the case for a Penn
Central ad hoc test,2 3 he does not hold, as Scalia would, that notice has no
bearing on an ad hoc analysis. 20 4 Rather, Kennedy merely holds that notice
does not bar Palazzolo's Penn Central claim.20 5 Thus, even more so than Jus-
tice Kennedy, Justice Scalia performs a rhetoric of actuality which freezes the
future in terms of the past, and rejects considerations of kairos. Once a land-
owner has title, It's Mine, and the individual's interest should be protected at
all costs against the government-thief.
Justice Scalia hones his simile in a takings case decided two years later, in
which he metaphorically describes the Just Compensation Clause as "the Robin
Hood Taking. 2 6 . Justice Scalia pens this metaphor in Brown v. Legal Founda-
1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Duncan, supra note 116, at 1157
(analyzing Kennedy's opinion in Lucas as a rejection of the Lockean view expressed by
Scalia in the majority opinion).
197 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198 Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring). Numerous legal scholars have analyzed Justice
Scalia's rhetoric. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 88, at 204 (arguing that "Justice Scalia's dis-
sent [in VMI] only partly succeeds as an example of effective advocacy. While he does
succeed in arousing readers' emotions, he consistently squanders his emotional capital with
gratuitous attacks that compromise his credibility"); Yury Kapgan, Of Gold and Ghouls:
The Prose Style of Justice Scalia, 9 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 71 (2003);
David M. Zlotnick, Battered Women & Justice Scalia, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 847 (1999).
199 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200 Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
201 id.
202 Id. at 637.
203 Id. at 632.
204 Id. at 637.
205 Id. at 630.
206 Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy joined in Scalia's dissent, which supports the observation that Kennedy's
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tion of Washington, the IOLTA takings case.20 7 In Brown, Justice Scalia dis-
sented from the majority holding that no compensation was due and postulated:
[p]erhaps we are witnessing today the emergence of a whole new concept in Com-
pensation Clause jurisprudence: the Robin Hood Taking, in which the government's
extraction of wealth from those who own it is so cleverly achieved, and the object of
the government's larcenous beneficence is so highly favored by the courts (taking
from the rich to give to indigent defendants) that the normal rules of the Constitution
protecting private property are suspended.20 8
Justice Scalia's "Robin Hood Taking" metaphor demonstrates the exten-
sion of his It's Mine rhetoric. Moreover, his comments about the purpose of
the IOLTA accounts - to fund "tax-exempt law-related charitable and educa-
tional purposes ' 2 9 - also demonstrate It's Mine rhetoric and a rejection of an
Isocratean sense of social responsibility. 210  Regarding the purpose of the
account, Justice Scalia sarcastically writes: "Surely it cannot be that the Jus-
tices look more favorably upon a nationally emulated uncompensated taking of
clients' funds to support (hurrah!) legal services to the indigent than they do
upon a more local uncompensated taking of clients' funds to support nothing
more inspiring than the. . . circuit courts."2' 1
His sarcastic It's Mine comment is in response to the majority opinion's
characterization of the purpose of the IOLTA funds, in which Justice Stevens
conveys a Let's Share rhetoric that incorporates Isocrates' sense of the impor-
tance of social responsibility.
Even though there may be occasional misuses of IOLTA funds, the overall, dramatic
success of these programs in serving the compelling interest in providing legal ser-
vices to literally millions of needy Americans certainly qualifies the Foundation's
distribution of these funds as a "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.
2 12
Justice Stevens also quotes the comments of the Ninth Circuit dissenters that
the programs were "'an exceedingly intelligent idea"' and that they "'serve[d]
a salutary purpose, one worthy of our support.' "213 Once again, the justices
employ competing rhetorics, and the tension builds in Palazzolo with Justice
O'Connor's concurrence.
rhetoric has shifted from the Let's Share rhetoric of Lucas to an It's Mine rhetoric in both
Palazzolo and Brown. See discussion infra notes 258-61.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 224.
210 See discussion supra note 33.
211 Brown, 538 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is an illustration of the point made
by Jim Corder, that we are often so steeped in our own rhetorics that we cannot see the
rhetoric of others. Corder, supra note 86, at 98. On the other hand, I may be so steeped in
my own rhetoric that I cannot see that perhaps Justice Scalia is concerned with an Isocratean
sense of social responsibility.
212 Brown, 538 U.S. at 232.
213 Id. at 232 n.7 (quoting Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Washington, 236
F.3d 1097, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)); 271 F.3d 835, 867 (en banc)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 5:615
THE RHETORICS OF TAKINGS CASES
3. Justice 0' Connor's Opinion: Penn Central as "polestar"'2 14
In contrast to Justices Kennedy and Scalia, Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence demonstrates the Let's Share rhetoric of possibility. While Justice Ken-
nedy remanded the case to the state court for a Penn Central analysis, he did
not elucidate how notice factored into reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions. Other justices opined on this issue, however. Thus, although Justice
O'Connor agrees with Justice Kennedy that notice does not totally bar a takings
claim, she disagrees with Justice Scalia, who believes that notice is irrelevant to
a takings claim. 1 5
Justice O'Connor uses Let's Share rhetoric when she insists that notice is a
factor to consider in determining whether investment-backed expectations are
reasonable. 1 6 Her analysis focuses on the contingency and situational context
of takings cases: "Accordingly, we have eschewed 'any 'set formula' for deter-
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government rather than remain dispropor-
tionately concentrated on a few persons. ' '2 17  She notes that investment-
backed expectations are just one factor in the ad hoc test and "are not talis-
",218manic, consequently, "[o]ur polestar instead remains the principles set forth
in Penn Central itself. '2 9  By focusing on the balancing test, Justice
O'Connor relies on kairos and the rhetoric of possibility, because she joins
practical wisdom with the contingencies of a situation rather than on a discrete
event, or chronos, She states that this approach "simply restores balance to that
inquiry [concerning] the regulatory backdrop against which an owner takes title
to property. 22 0
The "justice and fairness" of O'Connor's Let's Share rhetoric allows com-
pensation for takings of private property when it would be unfair for the indi-
vidual "to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. '221  Thus, unlike Justice Scalia, Justice
O'Connor does not see property rights as frozen in time, but as fluid, depending
on the particular circumstances of a case.
Justice O'Connor makes a kairic argument for the propriety or balance of
her position. She urges that factoring notice into the analysis is more just than
the approach of either the Rhode Island Supreme Court or of Justice Scalia. It
is more just than the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding which gives
"investment-backed expectations ... exclusive significance in the Penn Central
analysis" because that results in giving the State 'far too much power to rede-
fine property rights upon passage of title."'222 Likewise, O'Connor argues that
214 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
215 id.
216 Id. In dissent, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer and Stevens agree with O'Connor's
view. Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at
643, n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217 Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
218 Id. at 634.
219 Id. at 633.
220 Id. at 635.
221 Id. at 633.
222 Id. at 635.
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her approach is more just than Scalia's approach of not giving investment-
backed expectations any significance because that results in "some property
owners ... reap[ing] windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost." 223
Thus, Justice O'Connor displays the rhetoric of Let's Share because she
focuses not on possible "windfalls" to the government, but on the Penn Central
balancing test, which requires a "careful examination and weighing of all the
relevant circumstances in this context. ,224 Under Justice O'Connor's Let's
Share approach, the state's wetland regulations may very well affect the use of
property, but determining whether the regulation is a taking requires a flexible
determination based on the contingency of the situation.
4. Justice Stevens' Dissent: "A taking is a discrete event "225
Justice Stevens' opinion takes a different tack by considering standing,
rather than notice.22 6 His dissent demonstrates both It's Mine and Let's Share
rhetorics. Justice Stevens uses It's Mine rhetoric when he reasons that Palaz-
zolo has no standing because he did not own the property in 1971 - the year the
wetlands regulations were adopted, and thus when the taking occurred.22 7 He
accuses the majority of "oversimplify[ing] a complex calculus, ' 228 which is the
chronos of a taking: "A taking is a discrete event .... Like other transfers of
property, it occurs at a particular time, that time being the moment when the
relevant property interest is alienated from its owner. "229
In Palazzolo's case, Justice Stevens concludes that the taking occurred in
1971 when the regulations were adopted 230 because "the regulations encum-
bered the title which was purchased. ' 231 The regulations provided that "there
'can be no fill for any likely or forseeable use,"' and thus diminished the prop-
erty value when they were adopted.232 His decision emphasizes the chronos of
the discrete taking, and employs the Aristotelian rhetoric of It's Mine to con-
223 Id. Justice O'Connor also criticizes Justice Scalia's "government-as-thief' simile as
confusing two separate questions: whether the state acted within its police powers, and
whether the landowner is entitled to just compensation. She sees Justice Scalia's analysis as
improperly focusing on whether the state acted within its police powers, an issue not relevant
to this case. Id. at 636.
224 Id. at 636.
225 Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226 Id. at 641-42.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 638.
229 Id. at 638-39.
230 Id. at 641-42.
231 Eric D. Albert, If the Shoe Fits, [Don't] Wear It: Preacquisition Notice and Stepping
Into the Shoes of Prior Owners in Takings Cases After Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 758, 795 (2003). Albert reads the majority decisions to allow Palazzolo stand-
ing because he "'stepped into the shoes' of the prior owner upon transfer of title.., and thus
did, in a technical sense, hold the property right before the government acted to take it
away." Id. at 796. This explanation of the majority holding is kairic because it considers
notice and timing to be on a fluid and flexible scale.
232 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 641 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Stevens distinguishes these facts from those in Nollan because in that
case the taking (a public access exaction) occurred after the property was transferred. Id. at
642-43. Stevens reasons that notice of the possibility of a future taking does not bar a
landowner's claim, but is relevant to an ad hoc determination. Id. at 643 n.6.
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clude that "it is pellucidly clear" that Palazzolo lacked standing. 233 However,
his decision also contains an element of Sophistic Let's Share rhetoric in his
discussion about Palazzolo's prospective rights.
Stevens analogizes the prospective rights to the situation of trespass in a
fruit orchard: "A new owner may maintain an ejectment action against a tres-
passer who has lodged himself in the owner's orchard but surely could not
recover damages for fruit a trespasser spirited from the orchard before he
acquired the property. '"234 Thus, Justice Stevens' rhetoric of actuality focuses
primarily on chronos. However, his analysis has a hint of kairos in the use of
his fruit orchard analogy, which appeals to the justice of right timing - the
injustice in allowing Palazzolo to recover for a wrong done to another, but the
justice of allowing him to prevent a continuing harm, such as an invalidly
enacted regulation.235
It is also important to point out that although Justice Stevens primarily
relies on chronos and It's Mine rhetoric in Palazzolo, in other recent takings
cases he employs Let's Share rhetoric.23 6 For instance in Tahoe-Sierra, which
involved a challenge to a building moratorium on Lake Tahoe, Justice Stevens,
who authored the majority decision, viewed property rights not as frozen in
time, but as flexible, and he emphasized that takings should be determined by a
pragmatic weighing of all factors. 23 7 He rejected a view of takings that would
emphasize chronos by treating temporal segments as distinct property inter-
ests. 238 Rather, he stated: "In our view the answer to the abstract question
whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is neither 'yes, always' nor
'no, never,' the answer depends upon the particular circumstances of the
case."
239
D. The Ripeness Issue: "Ripeness is. peculiarly a question of timing. ,240
Ripeness was the other issue the Supreme Court addressed in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island.24 This issue asks whether there was a final determination by
the agency that the court can review. In order to ripen his claim, Palazzolo was
required to "obtain[ ] a final decision from the Council determining the permit-
233 Id. at 641-42.
234 Id. at 642.
235 Id. However, Stevens also indicates that if the taking did not occur in 1971, Stevens
says he would agree with Justice Ginsburg that the case was not ripe. Id. at 644.
236 See supra text accompanying notes 212-13 (discussing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash-
ington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003)).
237 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002). Stevens authored the majority opinion in which landowners challenged the morato-
ria on building in the region surrounding Lake Tahoe. Justice Stevens' decision held that the
moratoria did not constitute categorical takings under a Lucas analysis. Id. at 320.
238 Id. at 318. The landowners argued that their land should be viewed in temporal seg-
ments. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, also urged a rule governed by chronos.
Id. at 346-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 321.
240 Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974), quoted in Hof, supra
note 80, at 836.
241 See supra text accompanying note 80; see also Hof, supra note 80 (reviewing doctrine
of ripeness in takings cases).
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ted use for the land,"24 because "'[a] court cannot determine whether a regula-
tion goes "too far" unless it knows how far the regulation goes.' , 243 However,
under the futility exception, "once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the
discretion to permit any development, or the permissible uses of the property
are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have
ripened," 2" and the landowner is not required to submit "further and futile
applications with other agencies. '245 The kairic nature of ripeness determina-
tions in general is discussed above; 246 this section considers the competing
rhetorics used in the Court's analysis.
The court in Palazzolo separately considered the question of ripeness for
the wetlands portion and the uplands portion.247 Justice Kennedy's majority
decision begins with Let's Share rhetoric, but ends with It's Mine. In contrast,
Justice Ginsburg's dissent consistently uses Let's Share rhetoric.
1. The Wetlands: An Exercise in Futility
First, was the denial for building on the wetlands portion ripe? Palazzolo
filed the 1985 application to fill eleven of the eighteen wetland acres for a
beach club; the Council denied this application for a special exception on the
ground that a beach club was not a "compelling public purpose. '"248 Was this
denial ripe, or should Palazzolo have requested a more modest public use as the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held?
2 49
Even though, as discussed above, Justice Kennedy did not find the beach
club aesthetically pleasing, in determining that the claim was indeed ripe, Jus-
tice Kennedy relied on kairic practical wisdom when he reasoned that it was
not necessary for Palazzolo to file a more modest application for the wetlands
portion because the outcome could be predicted: the Council would not allow
any development whatsoever.2 5 0 His reasoning employs Let's Share or Sophis-
tic rhetoric of possibility by applying the futility exception to these facts, rather
than requiring the certainty of a final judgment (chronos). Justice Kennedy's
kairic discourse on this point verges on hyperbole when he states:
On the wetlands there can be no fill for any ordinary land use. There can be no fill
for its own sake; no fill for a beach club, either rustic or upscale; no fill for a sub-
division; no fill for any likely or foreseeable use. And with no fill there can be no
242 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (citing Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
243 Macdonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986), cited in
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 622.
244 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620.
245 Id. at 626.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
247 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 621.
248 Id. at 620. Under the agency rules, a landowner was generally prohibited from filling or
building on wetlands, but could request a special exception to do so, "only where a 'compel-
ling public purpose' is served." Id. at 619.
249 Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I. 2000) (holding that the claim was not ripe
because Palazzolo had not sought permission to develop a subdivision and because "he has
not sought permission for less ambitious development plans").
250 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 621.
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structures and no development on the wetlands. Further permit applications were not
necessary to establish this point.
2 5 1
Rather than adopting the inflexibility and chronos of the final determination
requirement, Kennedy considers the contingency and practicality (futility) of
the situation. This holding and rationale may be contrasted with Justice Ste-
vens' formalistic emphasis on chronos, discussed above, in which Stevens
argues that Palazzolo had no standing to bring the takings claim.252
2. The uplands: A "bait-and-switch ploy" ?253
The second ripeness issue concerned the uplands portion of the land. This
land was not wetlands, and presumably, Palazzolo could have built on this por-
tion, but, significantly, he did not submit an application to build on the
uplands.25 4 Thus, the Rhode Island Court held that his claim was not ripe.2 55
The ripeness issue for the uplands centered on whether there was a known
value for the land.256 If "the value of the uplands [was] in doubt," as the state
claimed, then a court could not rule on a takings claim.25 7
Once again, in holding that the uplands claim was ripe, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the Let's Share rhetoric of possibility. However, his analysis has
threads of It's Mine rhetoric, which becomes apparent only when his decision
is contrasted with Justice Ginsburg's. Justice Kennedy reiterates the rule that
"'[a] court cannot determine whether a regulation goes 'too far' unless it knows
how far the regulation goes."' 258 He goes on to reject the state's contention
that the value of the uplands portion was "in doubt" by ruling that the state
waived the ability to controvert the $200,000 value pled by Palazzolo when the
state accepted this value at trial.25 9 Kennedy's analysis again shows the practi-
cal wisdom of kairos that allows him to hold that "there is no genuine ambigu-
ity in the record as to the extent of permitted development on petitioner's
property, either on the wetlands or the uplands. 260
However, Justice Kennedy's analysis is haunted by possible inequities,
which Justice Ginsburg raises in her dissent. Reading Kennedy's analysis in
light of Ginsburg's dissent suggests that Kennedy's It's Mine rhetoric domi-
nates over his Let's Share rhetoric because his reasoning relies on chronos,
251 Id. Kennedy used this same reasoning to overrule the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
holding that the case was not ripe because Palazzolo had not submitted an application to
build a subdivision, and yet, used the subdivision as a basis for damages. Palazzolo, 746
A.2d at 714. Justice Kennedy again applies Let's Share rhetoric to hold that Palazzolo was
not required to submit a plan for a subdivision on the wetlands, because the agency would
not allow a subdivision. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 624-26. "Petitioner was informed by the
Council that he could not fill the wetlands; it follows of necessity that he could not fill and
then build 74 single-family dwellings upon it." Id. at 624.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 226-33.
253 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 622.
255 Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 714.
256 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 622-23.
257 Id. at 622.
258 Id. (quoting Macdonald v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)).
259 Id. at 623.
260 Id.
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rather than kairos. This notion that the dissenting decision changes our reading
of the majority decision is consistent with Paul Gewirtz's observation that:
[t]he existence of multiple opinions [in contemporary judicial opinions] defeats the
ability of any single opinion to enshrine any particular version of reality as the
undoubted truth .... Multiple opinions are also reminders that the sources of law at
hand are far richer than any one account exhausts, that each account contains the
shaping mind of its describer, and that judges come to different understandings about
what the law means.
26 1
In her dissenting decision, Justice Ginsburg employs the Sophistic rhetoric
of possibility, or Let's Share. Justice Ginsburg's dissent makes a compelling
argument that the lower court's value should not be binding, and that Ken-
nedy's analysis is "inequitable. ' 262 Her argument is that Palazzolo used a
"bait-and-switch ploy" regarding the $200,000 value 26 3 because at the lower
court level, Palazzolo claimed that the regulation was a Lucas total taking
claim, and in order to defeat the total taking claim, the state needed merely to
show that some valuable use of the land still existed.2 " The state's showing
that the uplands would support at least one $200,000 home defeated Palaz-
zolo's claim that the regulation deprived him of all economically beneficial use
of the land.2 6 5 The state had no need to show whether more than one house
could be built on the uplands or whether it had a value greater than $200,000
because Palazzolo was not making a Penn Central claim. 266 From Ginsburg's
view, the state did "not foreclose the possibility that [it] would also approve
another home," but rather, "the State's submissions established only a floor, not
a ceiling, on the value of permissible development. "267
Justice Ginsburg called Palazzolo's maneuver a "bait-and-switch" ploy
because at the Supreme Court level, Palazzolo asserted that the regulation was
a taking under the Penn Central test and that only one house in the uplands
would be approved.2 6 ' Ginsburg thus questioned the ethics of the majority's
waiver decision, resulting in a holding that the state had waived a claim that the
uplands property was worth more than $200,000, and opining that the value of
the uplands was not known.
2 6 9
Reading Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in light of Justice Ginsburg's
criticism raises a question about which rhetoric his ripeness analysis employs.
Reading Kennedy's decision first and in isolation from the other decisions sup-
261 Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW'S STolRES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 11-12 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996).
262 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Souter and Breyer joined in Gins-
burg's dissent, and Breyer authored a separate dissent agreeing that the Palazzolo's claim
was not ripe. Id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Moreover, Stevens' dissent on the notice
issue states that if Palazzo could somehow come up with an argument that would give him
standing (such as the agency applying unforeseen interpretations or extensions of regula-
tions), then Stevens would agree with Ginsburg's analysis that Palazzolo's claim was not
ripe. Id. at 644, n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
264 Id.
265 Id. at 648-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266 Id.
267 Id. at 651-52.
268 Id. at 652.
269 Id. at 648-49.
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ports a characterization of his decision as Let's Share rhetoric. However,
reading his decision along with Justice Ginsburg's decision supports a charac-
terization of his decision as It's Mine rhetoric because he has focused on the
chronos of the proceedings to hold that the state waived the argument that the
value of the uplands was in doubt. This is a particularly good example of how
our interpretation of discourse shifts based on the given context.
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting decision has other indications of her discon-
tent with the ethical dimension of kairos in Palazzolo's case. For instance,
there is a suggestion that Palazzolo evidenced bad ethos, not only by the "bait-
and-switch ploy," but also in his application to develop that land at all. Gins-
burg quotes his "sworn 1983 answer to the question why he sought to fill
uplands" as: "'Because it's my right to do if I want to to [sic] look at it it [sic]
is my business.' "270 Ginsburg thus uses Let's Share rhetoric by focusing on
the due measure aspect of kairos and on the particular circumstances of this
case and of Palazzolo's claim. Justice Kennedy uses Let's Share rhetoric in
analyzing the wetlands, and he uses both It's Mine or Let's Share rhetoric, with
It's Mine dominating, in analyzing the uplands - depending on whether we
read his decision in isolation or in conjunction with Justice Ginsburg's deci-
sion.
V. CONCLUSION: TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AS "A MODE
OF 'IMPROVISATION' ,
2 7 1
The Takings Clause raises inherently kairic questions of timing and
due measure, and courts resolve these questions using different rhetorical
approaches. Thus, one way to explain the "muddle ' 272 of takings cases is as
the natural result of the collision between Let's Share and It's Mine rhetorics.
Its Mine rhetoric sees property rights as fixed, analyzes situations using chro-
nos, and emphasizes individual rights and custom over "the government-as-
thief."'273 On the other hand, Let's Share rhetoric sees property rights as fluid
and provisional. Let's Share rhetoric emphasizes kairos and the contingency of
the situation. The recent case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island2 74 provides an
example of these different rhetorics. Palazzolo also constitutes part of a body
of kairic discourse, or takings case law as "a mode of 'improvisation.' , 27 5 A
rhetorical analysis of takings case law opens up the tension between It's Mine
and Let's Share rhetorics and thus both explains and complicates the "muddle."
270 Id. at 647 n.1. Palazzolo's comment echoes the It's Mine rhetoric of the "Wise-Use"
movement which believes "people have a right to do with their land as they damn well
please." See Duncan, supra note 116, at 1097.
271 Sipiora, supra note 2, at 6-7.
272 RosE, supra note 1, at 65-66.
273 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
274 Id. at 606.
275 Sipiora, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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